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Introduction
Recent revelations concerning the US National Security Agency’s (NSA) attempts at global
surveillance bring the re-emergence of the ‘state’ in cyberspace into sharp relief.1 These events
draw our attention to the web as a bordered, sovereign space rather than as the ‘placeless’
cyber domain which occupied the minds of early internet researchers. As Jiang and Okamoto
note given the NSA revelations, “The need to explicate the symbolic, economic, and political
implications of information technologies thus has never been greater (2014, 1).” Work on the
‘state’ and the internet is most clearly demonstrated by work on national web studies, which
focuses on political, economic, and social consequences of state internet regulation and policies
in a particular domain (Rogers et al, 2013; Jiang, 2011, Jiang and Okamoto, 2014). This research
focus is also engaged by literature that addresses the political, social, and economic
implications of information technology platforms (Introna & Nissenbaum, 2000, Jiang, 2011),
while associated work on ‘national information shaping strategies’ (Diebert and Rohoziniski,
2010, 6) focuses on the ways in which such economic, political, and social effects are
manipulated by states to achieve certain political goals.

Work on such strategies and their political, cultural, and economic effects has focused most
clearly on China, where the state’s determination to engage in national information shaping
strategies is clear. The so-called ‘great firewall’ shows the scope of the state’s ambition to
control online information access, and the concept of ‘internet sovereignty’ is clearly defined in
official documents, showing the state’s desire to shape as well as control such information.
Research on the Chinese web has focused on the complex links between government and
internet technology companies in the practice of censorship—in maintaining the great
firewall—and the effects of this censorship on the Chinese population. Such studies show that
internet companies in China cooperate closely with the Chinese state in the management of

1

This research is funded by the Internet Policy Observatory at the Center for Global Communication Studies at
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thanks interviewees in Vietnam who agreed to be interviewed despite their concerns about personal safety. All
efforts have been made to maintain their anonymity.
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information within China: the price of accessing the huge Chinese market is that they must act
as the workhorses of the state in Chinese cyberspace (Jiang, 2011, 2014, King et al, 2013,
MacKinnon, 2011). But Chinese internet companies are now expanding beyond Chinese
borders. Private companies such as Alibaba, Baidu, and Tencent are worth millions, and all
three are listed on international stock exchanges: they are private actors rather than direct
agents of the Chinese state outside China. However, despite their private status, their close
relationship with the state within Chinese borders is widely known beyond China, as the
country makes no secret of the importance it places on information control. This paper asks:
does the relationship between the Chinese state and Chinese internet companies affect those
companies’ international expansion? If so, how?

In asking these questions, the paper

contributes to emerging studies of the political, social, and economic implications of
information technology platforms, but adds a focus on the geopolitical implications of such
platforms. It adds to studies of the ‘state’ in cyberspace, but does so by studying Chinese
internet companies as embodiments of the Chinese state in cyberspace, beyond Chinese
borders, and even inadvertently.

This paper investigates the international expansion of one of China’s biggest internet
technology companies, Baidu, using Baidu’s recent attempted expansion into Vietnam as a test
case and taking a mixed methods approach. The first section of the paper begins by outlining
Baidu’s role in Chinese information control practices, and its participation in China’s broader
goal of ‘internet sovereignty.’ This section shows that the company participates actively in the
Chinese state’s goals of domestic information control, as it must if it is to maintain its access to
the Chinese market. This section also outlines Baidu’s international expansion plans and shows
that the company receives no official funding from the Chinese state in support of its expansion.

The second section of this paper examines the detail of Baidu’s expansion into Vietnam in 2012.
It argues that Vietnam is a natural market for Baidu given the Vietnamese government’s
interest in information control and historically strong relationships between the two countries.
However, it shows that Baidu has failed in the Vietnamese market and investigates the reasons
3
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for this puzzling failure given the apparently close relationships between China and Vietnam.
This failure offers a useful test case to investigate how the relationships between the Chinese
state and Chinese internet companies affect those companies’ international expansion.

In order to understand whether the relationship between the Chinese state and Chinese
internet companies affect Baidu’s international expansion this section operationalizes the
research question using a mixed methods approach combining a brief history of Baidu’s product
analysis in Vietnam, interviews with stakeholders in Vietnam’s technology community, and
analysis of Vietnamese press reporting. The latter involves inductive content analysis of eleven
Vietnamese news outlets over 2012, when Baidu began its launch in Vietnam in earnest. It
examines three themes which emerge consistently in this cohort of reporting concerning
Baidu’s expansion into Vietnam. These three themes link Baidu’s products in Vietnam to the
‘internet sovereignty’ practices of the Chinese state and to toxic Chinese geopolitics in the
South China Sea. These stories fostered an association between Chinese internet technology
platforms and controversial Chinese geopolitics in the South China Sea. An analysis of their
claims and interviews with members of Vietnam’s technology community quoted in the stories
suggest that such articles make false claims about Baidu’s practices which play on a broader
populist Vietnamese anger against Chinese moves in the South China Sea, as demonstrated by
boycotts of Chinese goods and anti-Chinese riots at the same time the stories were published. It
shows that this association occurs despite the fact that, as demonstrated in section one, Baidu
receives no official support from the Chinese state in its expansion efforts.

This paper contributes a new area of research on the geopolitical associations of internet
technology platforms to existing studies of the social, political implication of information
technology. It adds to studies of the state in cyberspace by showing that, at least for Chinese
companies in Vietnam, the state is embodied in perceptions of the platform, even outside the
state’s physical borders: the company itself is ‘bordered.’

This finding has clear policy

implications for those policy actors who seek to predict the effects of the international
expansion of Chinese technology companies. It suggests that the market impact of such
4
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companies is potentially limited by negative public perceptions of the Chinese state in those
markets. These perceptions may be linked to understandings in those markets of the link
between Chinese government and Chinese information technology companies within Chinese
borders, and may also be linked to broader perceptions of Chinese geopolitics.

Section 1: Baidu and Chinese Internet Sovereignty
China’s domestic internet landscape is managed via a state policy known as ‘internet
sovereignty.’ First described in a Chinese white paper in 2010, this means that for the Chinese
state ‘within Chinese territory the internet is under the jurisdiction of Chinese sovereignty’
(Jiang, 2010, 73). As is well described in the literature, this means that the Chinese state
controls its citizens’ access to the internet by restricting access to certain sites, and controls the
flow of information online within its borders in more subtle ways, using the internet as a tool of
surveillance, censorship and information shaping (see King et al., 2013, Jiang, 2011, 2014,
MacKinnon, 2012). This ‘information shaping strategy’ (Diebert, Rohozinski et al., 2010, 6) is
exercised very clearly as part of the Chinese state’s goals of domestic political control, an
approach which Jiang (2010) describes as ‘authoritarian informationalism.’

Chinese technology companies are inextricably associated with these practices of internet
sovereignty via a process known as ‘networked authoritarianism’ (MacKinnon, 2010). This term
highlights the fact that Chinese information-shaping strategies are complex and reactive, and
MacKinnon’s work emphasises the fact that Chinese networked authoritarianism cannot work
‘without the active cooperation of private companies’ via a system of strict, stringently
enforced, and wide-ranging intermediary liability. The Chinese government imposes liability for
unlawful content on all intermediaries. If they fail to sufficiently monitor user activity, take
down content, or report violations, they may face fines, criminal liability, and revocation of
business or media licenses (MacKinnon et al., 2014). In practice, MacKinnon notes, this means
that “All Internet companies operating within Chinese jurisdiction – domestic or foreign – are
held liable for everything appearing on their search engines, blogging platforms, and social
networking services. They are also legally responsible for everything their users discuss or
5
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organize through chat clients and messaging services. In this way, much of the censorship and
surveillance work is delegated and outsourced by the government to the private sector – who,
if they fail to censor and monitor their users to the government’s satisfaction, will lose their
business license and be forced to shut down. All of China’s large Internet companies have entire
departments of employees whose sole job is to police users and censor content around the
clock (2010, 14-15).”

This paper focuses on one of the most prominent of China’s large internet companies, Baidu.
Although the company offers a dizzying array of products, Baidu’s flagship product is its search
engine. It is currently the largest search engine in China and the second-largest search engine
by users in the world, dominating the online Chinese population of over six hundred million.
This statistic is even more significant given that, until recently, Baidu had only operated within
China, and Chinese internet penetration is still below fifty percent (CNNIC, 2014). This means
that even as Baidu expands internationally, the bulk of its revenue is dependent on the Chinese
market, a fact confirmed by the company’s 2013 annual report (Baidu, 2013).

Like all Chinese internet companies, Baidu’s dominance of the market in China is dependent on
its cooperation with the Chinese government’s information management goals: as described
above, the company’s censorship practices must satisfy authorities. Accordingly, as Jiang (2013)
shows, Baidu shapes its search results in accordance with keywords banned by the state.
Founder Robin Li openly acknowledges the company is willing to cooperate with the Chinese
government in its censorship goals in order to further the company’s business strategies. For
example, in 2009, with nineteen other internet companies, Baidu received a ‘Chinese Internet
Self-Discipline Award’ for fostering “healthy, harmonious internet development (MacKinnon,
2012, 105).2”

2

The company also filters according to its commercial imperatives, taking paid search listings and placing listings
for its own products above those of its competitors (Jiang, 2011).
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Despite its close cooperation with the Chinese state, Baidu is a privately-owned company rather
than a state-owned enterprise. Baidu was listed on the NASDAQ in 2005, at that point the most
successful IPO in five years (Bloomberg, 2005). It currently has a market valuation of
approximately $US66billion (Fannin, 2014). It has no explicit links to the Chinese state in terms
of its ownership or its key personnel. As with all Chinese internet companies, however, Baidu’s
profitability and access to the Chinese market is determined by the state. This means that
despite being a private company Baidu is inextricably linked to China’s internet sovereignty by
the state, and by the company’s own business model. The state owns the very infrastructure
via which Baidu operates, controls currency exchange mechanisms in China, and restricts
foreign investment in ‘sensitive sectors,’ including the internet industry. The sector is also
under increasing political pressure as the state continues to introduce further regulation of
online space.

The relationship between companies like Baidu and the Chinese state, then, is complex. It
recalls Castells’ characterization of such enterprises as ‘little sisters’: commercial entities whose
online activities are simultaneously intertwined with, separate from, and arguably dependent
upon the state’s agenda (2001, 180). Baidu is a private actor constrained by the demands of the
Chinese state: its profit in China is dependent on the whims of the government.

Baidu Goes Global
Responding to increasing competition in the Chinese market, Baidu began expanding
internationally into emerging markets in 2010, focusing on South East Asia, Sub Saharan Africa
and Latin America. Founder Robin Li has announced that he intends Baidu to be the top search
engine in fifty percent of the world’s markets by 2020 (Carlson 2012). Baidu is not alone in its
international expansion. Chinese tech companies including Tencent and Alibaba are also
expanding their international operations. In 2011, Baidu opened a research centre in Singapore
focused on developing localised search products in South East Asian languages, especially Thai,
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Indonesian, and Vietnamese.3 Baidu now has a presence in over ten countries outside China,
including Egypt, Brazil, Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand, and Malaysia. In January 2013, Baidu
signed its first global operator agreement, with French telecommunications company Orange,

to co-develop an enhanced mobile browser designed for emerging markets in Middle East and
North Africa, where Orange has 80 million customers (Orange 2013).

The Chinese government is generally supportive of such expansion by Chinese technology
companies describing it as an opportunity to ‘win honour for Chinese companies (Chao and
Fletcher, 2011),’ and international expansion of high-tech industries is an important feature of
China’s ‘Go Global’ policy, first introduced in 1999 (see Smith and Darcy 2013 for an overview of
this policy). For a private technology company like Baidu, such support could mean loans for
capital investment overseas, innovation funding, or favourable currency exchange mechanisms.

However, state financial support for Baidu’s expansion appears nonexistent and to a large
degree unnecessary. For example, a detailed search of Chinese-language loan documents by
the author suggests that Baidu has not accessed any state-held lines of credit from any of
China’s three development/export banks: the China Development Bank, the Export-Import
Bank of China and the China Development Bank. When asked about state support for capital
expansion, head of international communications Kaiser Kuo explained in an interview with the
author that Baidu was a ‘cash-rich company’ and had no need of such credit (Kuo, 2014). A
detailed search by the author of Baidu’s publically available financial statements and SEC filings
show no financial support from state-linked bodies and there is no indication of support in the
form of exemptions from particular aspects of the currency exchange regime. Indeed, there is
little evidence that this should be necessary given the relatively small capital costs associated
with the overseas expansion of an internet company as opposed to, for example, a
manufacturing company.

3

The company engaged in a limited attempt at international expansion in Japan in 2007. This expansion proved a
substantial failure, largely due to the company’s inability to compete in a search environment dominated by
mobile phones. However, it is important to note that the company has also attracted a significant amount of antiChinese sentiment in Japan (Japandaily 2013).
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In addition, the relationship between Chinese information technology companies and the state
is increasingly complex—far more so than in other sectors, where state bodies are ready to
support international expansion (Sanderson and Forsythe 2012), complicating the level of state
support for this purpose. Domestically, the government is attempting to exert power even
more broadly over information flows and business in the internet sector. For example, in
January 2014, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) established the Central Internet Security and
Informatization leading group following the party congress in late 2013. The group is led by
the party’s head of propaganda, Liu Yunshan, who was named as a co-chair along with Premier
Li Keqiang. The state has also invested in developing its own search engine (Jike) introduced in
2010 (although it was then known as Goso)—in direct competition with Baidu. Jike is
unsurprisingly filtered even more strongly than other state-approved search products and
‘signals a significant state attempt at producing technologies to shape values (Jiang and
Okamoto 2014, 93).’ Baidu has also been subject to increasing state interest. In 2008 and 2011
the company was subjected to substantial investigations by CCTV, the state television company,
for including paid search results: no other internet companies have been subject to such
investigations.

This apparent attempt to exert more control over the internet environment domestically is also
likely a response not only to the internet’s political import but also to its already vast and
steadily increasing economic impact. The three biggest Chinese internet companies—Baidu,
Alibaba, and Tencent—have become the largest private sector companies in China by
capitalisation and revenue (Clover, 2014). This means they are not only powerful in terms of the
politics of information but also as private economic actors. The state has responded by
attempting to limit some aspects of their financial power. For example, the government
recently acted to stop the expansion of tech giants into other sectors, like finance. It suspended
virtual credit cards issued by Alibaba and Tencent, as well as mobile payments made by
scanning bar codes. Although these companies are central to the Chinese economy, the tech
sector is unlikely to be allowed to run unfettered because of its central political and increasing
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economic importance. This means state support for international expansion –and increased
profit—may be more complex than in other, less controversial sectors.

Baidu’s international expansion, then, is a commercial decision by a private company.
However, as outlined earlier in section one, because it by definition participates in the practice
of Chinese internet sovereignty, its identity as a private actor is fraught and inextricably linked
to the information control practices of the Chinese state.

Section 2: China, Vietnam and Baidu
China and Vietnam
Baidu began expanding into Vietnam in 2011, and the country served as Baidu’s first large-scale
expansion outside of China under its new policy. The Vietnamese market is a useful point of
expansion for Baidu for several reasons. First, Vietnam’s internet penetration is currently at
approximately forty percent, but is growing rapidly, and the country has the biggest online
population in South East Asia (Do, 2013b). The country is the largest games market in SE Asia,
and that market is dominated by Chinese games (Do, 2013). Second, China and Vietnam have a
close trade relationship, although that relationship heavily favours China: in 2012, China was
Vietnam’s second-largest export destination, and imports from China accounted for twentyeight percent of Vietnam's total import value (State, 2014). 4

Third, as one-party Communist states (broadly speaking), both countries share an interest in
information control. This should make the expansion of a company like Baidu into the market
relatively unproblematic, particularly in a context where the online space is clearly regulated in
the interests of a government with similar political ‘information sovereignty’ goals to the
Chinese state. Indeed, one senior technology figure within Vietnam suggested that Vietnamese
regulators were keen to associate with a company whose approach might be more respectful of
Vietnamese regulations than companies like Google and Facebook (Interview b, 2014). Beyond
similar political systems, then, the Vietnamese and Chinese states share similar approaches to
4

Note that this relationship was under strain in other sectors throughout 2013 – 2014 in the context of geopolitical
tensions concerning the South China Sea, as outlined in below in section 3.
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information control. Almost all traditional media in Vietnam is state controlled and the country
sits at 174 out of 180 on the Reporters Without Borders press freedom index, between Iran and
China (RWB, 2013). This interest extends to online material. Testing by the Open Network
Initiative found substantial filtering of politically sensitive websites in 2005, 2007, and 2010—
today, Vietnam’s netizens appear to be the heaviest users of censorship circumvention tools in
the world (OTF, 2014). Facebook is unofficially banned, though seventy-one percent of the
online population uses it: Vietnam has one of the highest rates of use of circumvention tools
globally (Do, 2013; OTF, 2014).

The Vietnamese government’s interest in control of online information is increasing, as
demonstrated by increasing crackdowns on bloggers: of the thirty-four bloggers detained in
early 2014, twenty-five were arrested since Nguyen Phu Trong became the ruling party’s
general secretary in January 2011 (RWB, 2014). Vietnam is the world’s second largest
imprisoner of bloggers and netizens (RWB, 2014). A recent regulation is clearly intended to
further chill online speech: Decree 72, the ‘Management, Provision, Use of Internet Services
and Information Content Online’, came into force in mid-2013 and bans the sharing of online
news stories on social media sites. Other measures appear to include manipulating Facebook’s
complaints process (Geigner, 2014). Anecdotally, interviewees reported that the Chinese and
Vietnamese governments appear to have cooperated in state-sponsored hacking – sharing
technology and techniques. It reasonable to suspect, then, that Baidu might enjoy a ‘censor of
choice’ status in Vietnam, given close China-Vietnam relations, the government’s interest in
information control, and Baidu’s close identification with Chinese information control practices.

Baidu in Vietnam
Baidu entered the Vietnamese market in 2011, under the seemingly favourable conditions
outlined above. However, by mid-2014, the company had largely withdrawn, and its venture in
Vietnam appears to have failed. Baidu has failed to build a market for its flagship search engine
product or for its social network: the latter no longer exists, having been introduced in 2012,
and the former was never introduced despite a domain name being registered. The company
11

THE GEOPOLITICS OF TECH: BAIDU’S VIETNEM – JUNE 2015
did not open a standalone office in Vietnam, and its staff numbers have been reduced
considerably, reportedly never rising above twenty (Interview d, 2014). By 2013, the company
had stopped investing in Vietnamese in its Singapore research lab (Millward, 2014) and Baidu is
reluctant to comment further on its ventures in Vietnam. The director of international
communication stated in an interview: “Our expansion has not just slowed, it has stopped (Kuo,
2014).” This is puzzling: Baidu entered Vietnam as the world’s section-largest search engine
and as a company with products ostensibly of interest to the Vietnamese government, as well
as with a strong history of China-Vietnam economic relations. This section investigates this
failure and argues that Baidu’s failure in Vietnam is due to Baidu’s susceptibility to anti-Chinese
sentiment, driven by geopolitical tensions in the China-Vietnam and by its inescapable
associations with Chinese internet sovereignty.

Changing China-Vietnam Relations
China-Vietnam relations stretch over five thousand years, during which time the relationship
between the two countries has ranged from friend to foe and back again. As a result, although
the countries today have an important trade relationship and ostensibly share a broadly similar
political system as one-party Communist states, relations are more complicated than they
might first appear.

For almost ten centuries, Vietnam was under Chinese rule, after which point the Vietnamese
established their own empire in the region, followed by a period of French colonisation and
wars of decolonisation. China recognised the independent republic of Vietnam in 1950, but the
country became an ideological battleground in the Sino-Soviet split of the 1970s, marked by the
Sino-Vietnamese border war of 1979, when Chinese troops crossed the border and occupied
part of Vietnam. Relations were normalised in 1991 (see Thayer 2008 and Womack 2008 for an
overview of the history of SCS tensions).

Territorial issues animating current relations between Vietnam and China focus on the South
China Sea (SCS), a maritime area bounded by China, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Japan. The
12
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area has historically been contested by a variety of these states and is an important maritime
trade route—over a third of global trade passes through its shipping lanes. The discovery of
significant oil and gas reserves in the late 1960s has only intensified matters, and the area has
been the site of longstanding geopolitical jockeying between China and the United States.

The conflict between China and Vietnam in this area dates to before the discovery of oil and gas
and is arguably driven as much by nationalism and the history of territorial conflict between the
two nations as by oil and gas reserves. China first laid controversial claim to the Paracel Islands
in the South China Sea in 1948, issuing a map now known infamously in Vietnam as the ‘Cows
Tongue Map,’ which increased its territorial claim in the South China Sea to include areas
beyond its official maritime boundary, including the Paracel and Spratly Islands, which form the
basis of current tensions. Reunification saw Vietnam become more aggressive in its territorial
claims, leading to numerous naval clashes between the two nations over the Paracels in 1974 –
1975, and over the Spratlys between 1979 and 1982. Tensions flared again in the 1980s, and in
1988 a naval battle off the Spratly Islands saw seventy Vietnamese sailors killed.

Despite normalisation in 1991, China attempted a legal claim to the area via its ratification of
the UN Convention of on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1996, and territorial incursions
continued throughout the 1990s in the form of oil and gas exploration and fishing vessels.
Despite this, Vietnamese responses remained at the level of discourse, and relations between
China and Vietnam remained regularised, with little to no disruption in high-level visits and
trade negotiations.
From 2005, onwards, however, Beijing renewed its territorial aggression in the SCS.5 In July
2012, for example, China formally created Sansha City, an administrative body with its
headquarters in the Paracels which purports to oversee Chinese territory in the South China
Sea—including the Paracels and the Spratlys (Zhang, 2013). Tensions continued to escalate
5

Analysts disagree on the reasoning behind these anxieties, but suggestions include concern about increasing US
influence in the SCS and concern over the development of resources in the region (see Thayer 2008, 2014,
Womack 2008).
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throughout 2012 and beyond: the Chinese navy allegedly deliberately sabotaged two
Vietnamese exploration operations in 2012, and reports throughout 2011 – 2012 of Chinese
naval vessels kidnapping or harassing Vietnamese fishermen continued to raise tensions. A new
version of the Chinese passport in November 2012 depicts a map of China including its
controversial South China Sea claims. In May 2014, the installation of a Chinese drilling rig into
waters near the Paracel Islands led to multiple confrontations between Vietnamese and
Chinese ships. The rig was removed after three months, but the period marked what many
analysts see as the most dangerous period in China-Vietnam relations in modern times (Thayer,
2014).

This assessment of actual crisis was driven by changes in Vietnam’s stance on Chinese territorial
ambitions in the SCS, beginning in 2011-12 and reaching their peak in 2014. Since the
normalisation of relations in 1991, and in recognition of the extreme trade and military
imbalance between the two countries, the Vietnamese government has been reluctant to
convey its displeasure at Chinese incursions. Indeed, anti-Chinese protests and sentiments have
long been censored in Vietnam. This reluctance to allow the expression of anti-Chinese
sentiment also has a domestic importance. Because of the strong political relationship between
the two one-party states, in many cases anti-Chinese sentiment in Vietnam is conflated with
anti-government sentiment or with divisions between progressive and non-progressive factions
in government, and so banning its expression serves an important domestic political function.
For example, anti-government activists began focusing on renewed Chinese territorial
incursions in the SCS in 2008, long before the government reacted in any way. These protests
were quashed and the issues not covered in the Vietnamese state press (BBC, 2011a, 2011b;
Viet Tan, 2008).
The Vietnamese government’s approach appears to have changed in 2011-12, and more
significantly in 2014. Large-scale street protests in 2011 were allegedly-though not openlysanctioned by government, because they were not clearly shut down as others had been in the
past (Ruwitch, 2011). State sanctioning of anti-Chinese protests was clearer in 2014 when,
following the oil rig incident, the government not only allowed large demonstrations in front of
14
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the Chinese embassy in Hanoi and elsewhere in Vietnam, but also allowed the state press to
report freely on them for the first time (AP, 2014).
Despite these apparent changes, following large-scale anti-Chinese riots in mid-2014, the
government resumed its crackdown on anti-Chinese protests, claiming the riots had been
organised by Viet Tan, the banned opposition political party, and explicitly prohibiting such
gatherings and reinstating crackdowns on anti-Chinese reporting. Tensions remain, but
government support for protests has not been reinstated, and links between the government
and China have continued to be the focus of anti-government groups. Indeed, following antiChinese riots in May 2014, the government sent a text message to all Vietnamese mobile
subscribers ordering citizens to ‘stay within the law’ and announced that security forces would
arrest those who violated the law. Anti-Chinese protests were violently quashed and protesters
arrested, whereas previously-as described above-the government had become unusually
permissive of anti-Chinese activity (Khanh et al, 2014).6

Press Reporting on Baidu in Vietnam
Baidu’s entry into Vietnam was initially relatively unproblematic. It registered its first
domain name, baidu.com.vn, in 2006, indicating that it intended to introduce a
standalone search service. It also introduced a question and answer service, zhidao.com, and a
web portal, hao123.com, in late 2011, though without a large marketing campaign. In mid2012 it launched an advertising campaign for two products: its social network, Baidu Tieba (also
known as tradaquan), and a music player, TTplayer. However, as mentioned above, the
company experienced a crippling failure, and by 2014 had essentially withdrawn from Vietnam.
The company refuses to comment on the mechanics of its failure and withdrawal, but 2012 was
a pivotal year for Baidu’s expansion into Vietnam, as it marked the company’s attempts to
introduce two flagship products to the market.

6

This means many interviewees who participated in this project were clear that they did not wish to be identified
or to directly link themselves to anti-Baidu reports given the issue’s links to anti-Chinese activity.
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This section of the paper undertakes a basic inductive content analysis of Vietnamese press
reporting on Baidu in 2012 to operationalize the following research question: Does the
relationship between the Chinese state and Chinese internet companies affect those companies’
international expansion? This section analyses a range of newspaper reporting to understand
the framing of Baidu in the popular press in Vietnam, seeking to ascertain the role of
newspapers in agenda-setting and framing on this issue (McCombs and Shaw, 1972; Scheufele
and Tewksbury, 2007). Vietnam is an interesting case study in this regard. Despite the fact that
Vietnam’s media is ‘not free’ (RWB, 2014), the relationship between the state and the media in
Vietnam is complex, driven by the interplay of communist party apparatus, intra-party and
inter-bureaucratic competition, market reforms, and the pluralisation of Vietnamese society
(see Cain 2013). This means that rather than simply reflecting a government agenda, press
reporting in Vietnam may in fact reveal both government and public sentiment. This is
important on an issue involving Chinese companies given the complexities of the ChinaVietnam relationship during 2012 as outlined above.

As Cain (2013) shows, the press in Vietnam is allowed a certain amount of freedom to report on
issues which may be controversial—such as certain types of corruption and environmental
issues—but which legitimate the party’s position or resolve elite conflict. Cain (2013, 88)
describes this as the press’ taking on a role of state-sanctioned watchdog under state authority,
but one utilised by the government as an agent of ‘repressive tolerance (Marcuse, 1969, 95137),’ meaning journalists are allowed to push the boundaries on ‘legitimate controversies’ as
long as they do not threaten the party directly (see Hassid 2012 for a similar discussion of
agenda setting in Chinese news media). This accounts for the party’s use of the media to
manage inter-bureaucratic competition and elite dissatisfaction, both processes which can
facilitate some level of anti-government reporting within a state-sanctioned framework. In
addition, the newspaper sector has been subject to marketization reforms introduced in the
1980s and 1990s. Unable to pay adequate salaries or provide free newsprint, the government
allowed media companies to generate revenue through advertising under revised media laws
(McKinley 2009). This means that some media outlets have taken advantage of non-state
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investment to create financially independent organisations run along business lines. Decreased
financial dependence on the state has arguably contributed to a loosening of editorial
constraints imposed by the state and an increase in press standards (McKinley, 2009). As Cain
(2013, 88) points out, such ‘soft corporate authoritarianism’ (Dixon, 2004) means that
newspaper outlets have the space and the incentive to pursue controversial reporting as well as
standard, party-approved reporting. Such reporting is fostered or tolerated by the state when
it conforms to party interests-for example, on certain types of reporting about corruption-and
also proves an attractive business model (especially for online news outlets), as it attracts
readers.
Following McKinley (2007, 24), this analysis focuses on eleven news outlets, selected because
they range from news outlets close to central party organisations that are based in Hanoi to
news outlets more distant from the centre that are based in Ho Chi Minh city (HCM). News
outlets in HCM are generally further from the centre of party power in Hanoi, reflected in the
greater liberties such papers may take in publishing controversial articles, as well as in their
relative financial independence. This analysis includes two such outlets, Vietnam’s two most
popular newspapers Tuoi Tre and Thanh Nien. These papers are both based in HCM and are
owned by Party youth organisations. Both have a strong online presence and are run on a forprofit basis. This analysis also included two news websites: ictnews.com, which is published by
Vietnam’s Ministry of Information and Communication; and vietnamnet.vn, Vietnam’s oldest
online news site. Analysing a range of Vietnamese sources allows this project to understand a
range of governmental and popular attitudes in a way perhaps unique to Vietnam’s ‘soft
corporate authoritarianism (Dixon, 2004).’

This paper collected and analysed all reports which contained the word ‘Baidu’ across nine
newspapers and two online media outlets in Vietnam over 2012. These reports were collected
via a search of the online corpus of these outlets in Vietnam for the keyword ‘Baidu’ in 2012
(hard-copy archives are not routinely kept for Vietnamese newspapers)7 . These results were
7

Newspapers examined include: Thanh Nien, Lao Dong, Tien Phong, Tuoi Tre, Vietnam Economic Times, Quan Doi
Nam Dan, Saigon Giai Phong and Ha Noi Moi.

17

THE GEOPOLITICS OF TECH: BAIDU’S VIETNEM – JUNE 2015
coded for those which had Baidu as their main topic of discussion. Of twenty-three reports
which contained the word ‘Baidu,’ this search revealed eighteen reports which had Baidu as
their main topic of discussion across the eleven outlets. The remaining five reports simply
included Baidu in a list of companies discussed in neutral terms such as within the context of
Chinese IPOs. This analysis found that, although there were eighteen reports on Baidu across
these eleven outlets in 2012, the four more conservative newspapers did not carry any stories
at all.8 This process then coded the eighteen reports for a basic attitudinal stance to Baidu –
positive, negative or neutral. Of the eighteen stories which had Baidu as their primary topic,
fifteen were negative, with the remaining three being positive or neutral.9 Of the negative
stories, all appeared within two months of each other, between late June and late August 2012,
just as Baidu’s social network was launched in Vietnam. These stories also appeared following
China’s initiation of deep-water oil drilling in contested areas of the South China Sea in 2012,
when Vietnam-China relations began to deteriorate further. This shows a clear spike in
reporting, with that spike being wholly negative.10

The bulk of the anti-Baidu reports appeared in four outlets, Thanh Nien, Tuoi Tre, ictnews and
vietnamnet. The two newspapers in this list are described by media analysts as three of the
most progressive newspapers in Vietnam, owned respectively by the National Youth Union
(Thanh Nien), and the Ho Chi Minh City Youth Communist league (Tuoi Tre) (McKinley, 2007, 24;
Cain, 2013). One other newspaper, Tien Phong, also carried some negative stories about Baidu,
and is owned by the National Communist Youth League. Interestingly, the three newspapers
carrying anti-Baidu stories have also adopted a profit-driven model, differentiating them from
more traditional newspapers. Although their content is regulated by the state, the two
newspapers which carried anti-Baidu stories most prominently are profit-making enterprises, as
is vietnam.net. The populist overtones of much anti-Chinese sentiment in Vietnam, particularly
8

Ha Noi Moi, Quan Doi Nam Dan, Saigon Giai Phong or the Vietnam Economic Times
These comprised two stories on new Baidu tech products in China, and one on Baidu’s success in China.
10
At this point, as described above, the government had taken the unusual step of sanctioning anti-Chinese
protests: a spike in anti-Chinese reporting (usually controversial given its anti-government associations) is
contemporaneous with other state-sanctioned anti-Chinese measures. Cain (2013) describes a similar situation in
2009, where reporting on anti-Chinese sentiment was allowed in the press in an unusual manner to act as a
release for community tension concerning a controversial proposed Bauxite mine owned by a Chinese company.
9
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during 2012, means that those newspapers with a more profit-driven model are more likely to
be driven by delivering stories which attract readers whereas wholly state-owned newspapers
are not, suggesting that profit-driven outlets may be more likely to publish anti-Chinese stories.
As the managing director of Thanh Nien, and the author of all of that paper’s anti-Baidu stories
noted: “These stories are popular with readers. They want to read them and share them with
friends…That is why lots of newspapers copy my stories (Tri 2014).” All reports on Baidu are, by
default, subject to editorial review – a process which, according to one interviewee, happens at
weekly meetings between editors and government representatives from MICT (Interview f,
2014). Although the existence of a review process does not mean that these stories are
officially sanctioned, it does mean that, on some level, there was government visibility of Baidu
reports. This line of thinking is supported by the fact that ictnews, owned by the Ministry of
Information and Communications, was one of the main sources of anti-Baidu reporting.

Having conducted a basic analysis of the positivity or negativity of reporting, further analysis
involved inductive coding of themes among the fifteen negative stories. Three clear themes
emerged across the reports. All reports shared at least one of these themes and none of the
reports contained any alternative themes. The first theme alleged that Baidu Tieba had failed to
register under Vietnamese law, the second that Tieba had limited discussion of the Paracel
Islands (the subject of contentious Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea), and the
third claimed that TTplayer was installing spyware on behalf of the Chinese government. These
reports shared extremely similar wording, and were sometimes direct copies of earlier reports
in other newspapers. All reports shared the same quotes from representatives from Vietnam’s
technology security community, mainly the Vietnam Hackers Association, who raised issues
about Baidu’s links to China and who verified that Baidu’s products were indeed engaging in
pro-China practices. The following paragraphs outline these themes in more detail.

(i) Baidu Tieba’s Failure to Register Domain Names
The first negative report about Baidu in the Vietnamese press appeared in Thanh Nien on June
28, 2012 and was titled ‘China’s Baidu to launch unpermitted social network in Vietnam.’ The
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piece highlighted the fact that Baidu had quietly launched two products in Vietnam already
(hao123.com and zhidao.com), and noted that the company was about to launch a social
network (Baidu Tieba), but had failed to register it properly. The article quoted representatives
from the Ministry of Information and Communications Technology who outlined the necessary
procedures but did not directly comment on Baidu’s progress. One day later, ictnews.net
featured a very similar story, titled ‘Chinese Baidu attempts to silently penetrate Vietnamese
market,’ which contained the same quote from the ministry representatives and again
highlighted that Baidu had not registered its services. This article differed only in asserting that
Baidu was likely to have difficulty attracting users in Vietnam. On June 30, 2012, Thanh Nien
carried a story with the headline ‘Baidu silently invades Vietnam’ (Truong and Tri, 2012). This
story repeated the earlier story that Baidu was planning to launch products in Vietnam, but
included further examination of all the domain names registered by Baidu in Vietnam. In doing
so, the piece suggested-wrongly-that Baidu had violated regulations by using a local company
to register some of the domain names: no such regulations exist in Vietnam.

On July 2, 2012, vietnamnet carried a story titled ‘Baidu’s social network has no license to
operate in Vietnam (vietnamnet, 2012a).’ This story focused on the launch of tradaquan,
Baidu’s social network (otherwise known as Baidu Tieba), and carried quotes from ministry
officials confirming that Baidu had not applied for a license to operate a social network in
Vietnam. The story also highlighted the fact that ‘IT forum users’ were calling for a boycott of
Baidu’s products. The story was repeated on Tuoi Tre on July 4, 2012, with that story also
quoting an IT security consultant as saying: “Baidu websites have used their overseas servers so
that they avoid Vietnam’s control and can operate on the Internet without obtaining
a license from Vietnamese authorities (Nhung, 2012).” A version of the story attributed to Tuoi
Tre was published in a less progressive newspaper, Lao Dong, on July 4, 2012. Lao Dong also
published a story on July 5, 2012, suggesting that registration requirements were unclear, but
ultimately arguing that tradaquan should be registered because it had the capacity to draw
revenue in Vietnam (Lao Dong, 2012).
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However, in contrast to these claims, Baidu appears to have followed the required regulations.
For example, each of the articles mentioned above highlighted the fact that Baidu did not
operate its social network, Baidu Tieba (which was a direct copy of the Chinese site of the same
name) using the domain .com.vn, operating it instead via the domain vn.Tieba.com. Were the
reports true, this would mean that Baidu was refusing to use a local server and was insisting on
hosting its sites on a Chinese server. However, this was not the case. The company registered
Tieba.com.vn in January 2012, but in early June 2012 it registered the domain names
tradaquan.com.vn and vn.tradaquan.com and ensured that all versions redirected to
Tieba.com.vn. This suggests that Baidu changed the name of its service from Baidu Tieba (a
direct copy of the Chinese name of the same service) quite late in the launch process to
tradaquan, a Vietnamese word meaning ‘iced tea shop.’ The reasons for the late-stage name
change are unclear, but suggest an unanticipated attempt to distance the Vietnamese version
of the service from the Chinese service. Baidu representatives were unwilling to discuss this
issue.

The use of Tieba.com.vn as the ultimate address despite the name change also shows that
company had no qualms about operating as a .com.vn domain, meaning it used a local server;
therefore, the story about the company refusing to use a local service appears false. In fact,
regulation of offshore social networks in Vietnam was, at that time, entirely unclear, and Baidu
appears to have exceeded the required level of regulation. Decree 72, introduced late in 2013,
requires all social networks to register with the Vietnamese authorities and to operate at least
one server in Vietnam. This was not the case in 2012. As one leading technology lawyer agreed,
in 2012, social networks were only required to register with the authority, without having to
have local servers in Vietnam, noting:
‘There were no specific conditions regarding whether a social network of
an offshore service provider having a “.vn” domain must register. Our
understanding is that Baidu at first tried to launch without registering
with the relevant authority. However, the authority really wanted Baidu
to register but they lacked the legal basis for that, and that incident
caused some bad press for Baidu. Baidu then changed the domain to
“.com.vn” to avoid a messy situation.” (Seck Yee 2014).
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Indeed, in an interview with BBC Vietnam in early July 2012, one Baidu official stated that the
management of the website would ‘fully conform to Vietnam government regulations’ in
operating internet forums (BBC, 2012a). However, the Thanh Nien report from June 30, 2012
quoted above (wrongly) alleged that Baidu continued to violate the registration by failing to
route traffic through Vietnam, simply because the .com.vn address resolved to
www.vn.Tieba.com. As one member of Vietnam’s Hacker Association (HVA) noted, ‘Baidu was
going to use the .vn domain but they didn’t get the chance’ - acknowledging that in this case,
Baidu was not opposed to doing the correct thing, but was simply unable to gain traction in the
face of negative reporting (Interview c, 2014).

(ii) Baidu Tieba and the South China Sea
A second theme of reporting on Baidu’s social networking product emerged at the same was
regularly covered in the same reports concerning Baidu’s registration as discussed in the
previous section. These reports, published immediately after Baidu Tieba’s launch on July 20,
alleged that Baidu did not allow discussion of the Paracel or Spratly islands on its social network
to include the Vietnamese names for the islands: reports asserted that the network would only
allow discussion using Chinese names for the islands. On July 22, 2012, Thanh Nien published a
piece titled ‘Concerns with Social Networking product Baidu Tieba’. In the piece, Ngo Minh Tri,
the Than Nien reporter, described his attempts to set up a discussion of the Spratly and Paracel
Islands using the Vietnamese terms, but alleged that only discussions using the Chinese names
(Nansha and Xisha, respectively) were allowed. He argued that this showed the “…hidden risk
that Baidu Tieba could become a vehicle for improper or infringing upon the sovereignty of
Vietnam. (Truong and Tri, 2012b).” A screen shot provided evidence of his efforts.
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Figure 1. (taken from Thanh Nien) showing that the social network did not allow discussions of
the Vietnamese name of the Spratly Islands (Hoang sa, 2012). [Text reads: ‘Sorry! Search has
been disabled for violation of laws or inappropriate content. You may open another box or go
back to the homepage’]
Similarly worded reports, with the same screen shot, appeared in ictnews on July 23, 2012,
which the author described as: “This hidden risk in Baidu Tieba is a means of spreading
misinformation and violating Vietnam’s sovereignty (My, 2012a).” The same test, with the same
screenshot, was discussed on Vietnam.net on the same day. Intriguingly, when asked to provide
evidence of the argument that Chinese names were allowed and Vietnamese names were not,
the author of the original article could not provide the relevant screen shot, and later said that
Baidu had changed its practices after his article had been published so that neither name could
now be used – it simply banned discussion of the issue. This resulted in the same screenshot
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captured in Figure 1 (Tri, 2014). Without direct evidence of the prioritisation of Chinese over
Vietnamese names, it is arguably the case that Baidu was simply trying to avoid facilitating the
discussion of controversial topics in general, rather than engaging in geopolitically-driven
naming practices, despite the way the issue was framed in the reports discussed above.

(iii) TTplayer, Baidu, and Spyware
The third theme which emerged in reporting on Baidu in 2012 focused on Baidu’s alleged
installation of ‘spyware’ on users’ computers. Such reports focused on TTplayer, Baidu’s online
music player, which requires users to download software to play music online. Several reports
also referred to hao123.com.vn Baidu’s web portal page. The service was launched on July 1,
2012 and the first report on TTplayer appeared on July 3, 2012, on ictnews.com. The same
claims were made, with the same quotes from the same sources, on vietnamnet on July 9,
2012, and on July 8, 2012 and July 10, 2012 on Tuoi Tre. Excerpts appeared in Thanh Nien on
July 22, 2012. Titled ‘Can Baidu interfere with users’ computers?’ on ictnews.com, the original
story outlined the fact that users who downloaded TTplayer automatically had an executive file
installed into their computers. This file changed users’ homepages to hao123.com.vn, Baidu’s
web portal page (My, 2012b).

The articles directly quoted representatives of the HVA and the CMC Infosec Security Research
Team that warned users of the spyware danger of this file. The articles quoted the VHA
representative as saying that TTPlayer contained a malicious file that “…was in fact a trojan,
which secretly hides on the host computer and can automatically download more viruses or
malicious files under the request of its creator via a remote connection…The infected
computers are easily subject to remote control, information stealing, or becoming zombie
computers in hackers’ distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks (Truong and Tri 2012b).”
Similar claims were made in these articles about hao123, a web portal launched by Baidu with
little fanfare some six months earlier.
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Importantly, and despite the technical credentials of the commentators, TTplayer does not
install spyware as outlined in the articles, although it certainly contains annoying adware. When
asked about this disparity, a senior member of the VHA answered as follows: “The evidence
about TT player and Hao123 is not real evidence. They just have automatic updates running in
the background. They update from a Chinese server…it’s just adware”…“But we tell the media
‘Hey, this can infect your computer and we don’t know what it will do”…“There is no evidence
of some things, so when we want to banish Baidu we can’t use some of the evidence which is
not strong enough. So we collect small amounts of evidence and wrap it up in the bigger
research, and then the media exaggerates (Interview c, 2014).” In summary, members quoted
in this article explicitly traded on fears in the community about Baidu’s links to Chinese internet
sovereignty practices such as spying and hacking.

Analysing anti-Baidu reporting in 2012
The preceding analysis shows a significant spike in July 2012 for reports in the Vietnamese press
that painted Baidu in a negative light. Importantly, these three themes are associated with the
practices of Chinese ‘internet sovereignty,’ outlined in the first section of this paper. The first
theme concerns Baidu’s failure to route Vietnamese traffic through Vietnamese servers, and
falsely alleged that the company routes all Vietnamese traffic through Chinese servers. This
theme links Baidu to Chinese territory in a particular way, suggesting that the way Chinese
internet companies handle information is territorially bounded by the Chinese state: in this
telling, Internet-borne data travels from Vietnam to within the borders of the Chinese state,
literally interpreting the concept of ‘internet sovereignty.’ The second theme, which alleges
that Baidu’s social network does not allow Vietnamese users to use Vietnamese terms to refer
to contested territory in the South China Sea, links Baidu to contentious Chinese geopolitics. In
doing so, these reports allege that Baidu engages in practices of Chinese ‘internet sovereignty’
outside China’s borders by shaping online discussion just as it might within China, but this time
outside China, on non-Chinese users, and in support of China’s extraterritorial geopolitical goals.
The third theme falsely alleges that Baidu’s products install malware that facilitates broadly
defined ‘hacking’ activities. Security experts framed the issue as one of ‘remote control,’
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alleging that those who control the trojan (presumably Baidu, a Chinese company in China)
could influence the operation of users’ computers in Vietnam in a nefarious manner
reminiscent of the lack of control Chinese users have over their own computers. The
commentary thus frames Baidu in Vietnam as an extension of a company with interests
geographically located in China. Again, like the first theme, this theme suggests that the way
Baidu handles information is linked to the territorial identity of the Chinese state. Once again,
internet-borne data travels from Vietnam to within the borders of the Chinese state, resulting
in literal ‘internet sovereignty.’ Although the supposed malware is not discussed in terms of
international Chinese hacking practices (CitizenLab, 2014) or and the absence of privacy for
Chinese internet users, these issues are implied in the discussion.

In 2014, when this research was conducted, anti-Chinese demonstrations and reporting of antiChinese sentiment were explicitly banned, whereas in 2012 they had not been. This meant that
securing interviews with the journalists responsible for the above articles in order to ascertain
the reasons behind both this spate of reporting and what appears to be misrepresentation of
Baidu’s products was largely impossible. However, interviews with two senior members of
VHA11, the hacking community quoted in four of the fifteen articles outlined above, suggest
that the contributions of the respondents to these articles consciously frame Baidu as part of
China’s internet sovereignty. These answers elucidate the reasons for anti-Baidu sentiment
within the Vietnamese technological community, sentiments reflected in the articles identified
above.

When asked why they had consciously misrepresented Baidu’s TTplayer as carrying malware,
for example, two interviewees from the HVA responded with answers which clearly framed
Baidu as a tool of Chinese ‘internet sovereignty.’ As one interviewee noted: “They [the
Vietnamese government] want to do what China has done … We don’t want Chinese companies
here because they will do what the government wants (Interview c, 2014).” Another explicitly
11

The Vietnam Hackers’ Association is Vietnam’s oldest hacking community. In existence since 1997, in late 2014 it
reportedly had close to 200,000 members, allegedly including some government members and journalists. Hacking
was made illegal in Vietnam in late 2014, when the VHA was shut down, allegedly by government demands.
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referred to Baidu’s role in Chinese networked authoritarianism: “Chinese products always
include censorship in their products because of the government … The Chinese products in
Vietnam are just the Chinese version translated into Vietnam (Interview e, 2014).” Another
noted: “We see it [Baidu] as a way for the Chinese government to broadcast their views.
Because we know how they control their own community (Interview c, 2014).”

These interviewees directly compared Chinese and US companies, saying that “It’s better to use
the Western product … If it’s Chinese it has the censorship engine. The government can use it,
so we should ban them.” Even when asked about the Snowden revelations, which suggested
that American companies were also likely to act in their government’s interests, interviewees
demurred: “Yes, but the Americans would never just invade us. They would tell us first
(Interview c, 2014).12” Here, interviewees add context to the content analysis by suggesting
that they provided deliberately misleading commentary on Baidu because they link it to
practices of Chinese ‘internet sovereignty’ which they do not want to see replicated in Vietnam,
practices which they link to Chinese geopolitical aggression.13

The fact that the bulk of anti-Baidu reporting appears in the two newspapers with a clear profit
model – Thanh Nien and Tuoi Tre—suggesting that the stories are profit generators: a judgment
borne out by the interview with Ngo Minh Tri quoted above. This is supported by the
observation that Baidu appears to have been caught up in a broader consumer backlash taking
place against Chinese products in 2012. For example, a Facebook page founded on June 23,
2012 urges users to boycott tradaquan, and the page achieved over fifteen hundred likes—a
not insignificant amount—within thirty days. Baidu Vietnam’s Facebook page for tradaquan,
12

Although beyond the concerns of this paper, this speaks to an interesting ‘civilisational’ valuation of information
technology products, and one which is important in the context of fraught and ongoing geopolitical tensions
between China and the US in Vietnam. As Wang and Ames (2010) argue, technological platforms embed values
which are associated with approaches to information which draw on longstanding cultural and political values –
they argue that Google, for example, embodies a ‘post-Enlightenment’ approach to information where Baidu and
other platforms offer a Confucian approach.
13
In fact, these interviewees suggested that the HVA influenced anti-Baidu reporting by planting stories in the
media via journalists who frequented their online forums. There is, of course, no way to check this assertion, but it
is notable that the first articles which appeared under the first and second themes referred to claims arising rom
‘online IT forums’.
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now deleted, reportedly failed to gain above five hundred likes (Various, 2012; Millward,
2014a). The anti-Baidu page associated Baidu products with a broader consumer boycott,
including discussions of boycotts of Chinese fruit and vegetables and school textbooks printed
in China. The page associated itself explicitly with broader geopolitical tensions around the
South China Sea. For example, it lists itself as founded in 1948, when China first published the
map of its extended claims in the South China Sea, and lists naval scuttles between China and
Vietnam in the region in the 1970s and 1980s as ‘significant life events.’ Technology companies
like Baidu are arguably more vulnerable than other Chinese companies to consumer boycotts.
Chinese agricultural and industrial goods have a price advantage which other producers simply
cannot match. In contrast, Chinese technology companies have no price advantage and have
obvious competitors in Google, Facebook, and other products—consumers switching products
incur no costs.

A simple content analysis, as has been undertaken here, makes no claims to causal inference. It
does not prove that the reason Baidu failed is that the Vietnamese population associated it with
Chinese practices of internet sovereignty. Instead, the analysis simply indicates a spike in antiBaidu reporting that falsely links Baidu’s practices in Vietnam to nefarious practices associated
with Chinese geopolitics and practices of Chinese internet sovereignty. This spike occurred in
the context of larger anti-Chinese sentiment associated with Chinese adventurism in the South
China Sea, and with rare governmental lenience on reporting of anti-Chinese sentiment and
anti-Chinese protests. Given the structure of the Vietnamese media, we can assume state
oversight of these media reports to some extent, and also, usefully, some popular appeal.

It is important to note that, outside of its association with anti-Chinese sentiment, Baidu’s
performance in Vietnam may have been affected by other factors. First, Vietnam’s internet
market is fragmented and the market is underdeveloped but dominated by Google (Do, 2014)
(Lavrenko, 2014). This may explain why even Naver, the giant Korean search engine, decided
not to compete in Vietnam, despite initial interest. At least one other senior tech executive in
the region also suggested that Baidu simply did not employ good local staff and failed to spend
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enough money on advertising (Interview f, 2014). Second, the government has an interest in
the online market, with close links to VNG, the country’s largest gaming and technology
company, which some observers argue leads the government to actively stifle competition
(Ngan, 2014). Indeed, ictnews, run by the Ministry of Information and Communications (MIC),
not only ran the same stories as other media outlets as outlined above, but added one story of
its own, which was not picked up by other outlets. On 6/7/2012, it ran a story reporting VNG as
complaining about Baidu threatening the ‘digital sovereignty of Vietnam’ by not complying with
government regulations (My, 2012c).

Ultimately, however, Baidu should have been the ‘censor of choice’ in Vietnam. As a Chinese
company, it enjoys the benefits of strong governmental and trade relations between the two
countries, and its practices in information control were likely to have been in demand by the
Vietnamese government. But early 2014, Baidu-branded products no longer existed in Vietnam,
and the company had stopped investing in Vietnamese language products. The company never
employed more than twenty staff in Vietnam, never opened branded office space, and never
launched its flagship search engine, despite having registered the appropriate domain name.
The cause of this failure is difficult to determine unequivocally. What is clear is that media
reporting in 2012 linked the company to Chinese geopolitical ambitions and to practices of
Chinese ‘internet sovereignty’ at a time of great strain in China-Vietnam relations and in the
context of associated boycotts of Chinese goods. The company itself recognized that it was
subject to anti-Chinese sentiment driven by toxic geopolitics and that these associations
directly affected the company’s interests. As an anonymous ‘high-placed’ Baidu employee
explained to BBC in late 2012: “The reason our product has not gained any success yet is
because it was launched into Vietnam market in a very sensitive period when Vietnam-China
relations were deteriorating…We are very surprised at the angry response of the Vietnamese
Internet community towards our products…Baidu is considering whether we should keep going
or not…The reason our product has not gained any success yet is because it was launched into
Vietnam market in a very sensitive period when Vietnam-China relations were deteriorating
(BBC, 2012b).”
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Baidu has also been subject to anti-Chinese sentiment elsewhere. In Japan, where relations
between the two countries have long been strained, recent allegations suggest that the
company’s products include forms of spyware (Japan Daily, 2014). Importantly, other Chinese
technology companies are not immune: WeChat experienced a significant consumer backlash in
Vietnam after it was discovered that maps accessed when users were in China showed a map of
the SCS in China’s favour (Millward, 2014b), and the Indian air force reportedly initially banned
its pilots and their families from using phones by the Chinese phone company Xiaomei due to
spying concerns (D’sa, 2014). 14 Both of these examples are associated with significant
geopolitical tensions between China and Japan and between China and India, respectively.

Conclusion
Scholarly research on the Chinese internet which attends to the social and political impact of
search has so far focused on the complex relationship between Chinese technology companies
and state demands (MacKinnon, 2010; Jiang, 2011, 2014; King, 2012). Such work broadens
research on the role of the state in cyberspace, highlighting the bordered nature of cyberspace,
in contrast to earlier ideas of the internet as a globalized and borderless space. This paper has
shown that the relationship between the state and internet companies in China extends the
concept of the state beyond physical borders, arguing that the ‘state’ is imbued in the
corporate identities of Chinese internet companies as they expand abroad, despite these
companies’ statuses as private entities.15
14

The company denies these allegations and is planning to move its servers for non-Chinese users outside China to
alleviate these concerns (D’Sa 2014).
15
On occasion, association with the Chinese state even outside Chinese borders is largely beyond Baidu’s control.
For example, Baidu recently established an office in Brazil, which was formally opened by Xi Jinping, who was in
Sao Paolo to secure Brazil-China trade talks. As one of the giants of the Chinese internet industry, Baidu’s
expansion was lauded by Beijing at the Brazil launch and in state press as an example of Chinese soft power. State
press reported the opening in distinctly geopolitical terms: ‘If the Brazilian search market is not captured by Chinaled Baidu, it will be taken by US-led Google. From material to spiritual influence, Baidu’s Brazil search is the triple
jump for China’s influence and for Chinese industries going abroad, and has great symbolic significance for both
endeavours’. Such reporting also expounded unhelpfully on the link between Chinese government information
control practices and Baidu’s products. ‘Everyone knows that search is the essence of information technology, and
this technology is based on natural sequencing and crawler bots, but human intervention is an important and
indispensable step. In determining search results, there are value judgements and tendentious interventions. It’s
fair to say that all search engines have a position and an orientation, regardless of whether this orientation is
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The first section of this paper outlined the role of Chinese internet companies like Baidu in the
practices of Chinese ‘internet sovereignty.’ It showed how Chinese controls on internet
company infrastructure and finances keep such companies subject to significant government
influence as long as the bulk of their market remains in China. However, it also showed that, at
least in terms of official financing, there is no state support for Baidu’s international expansion.
The second section of this paper showed that Baidu has failed to gain any market share in
Vietnam, a market in which it might reasonably be expected to excel. This section finds that,
even in the absence of any clear links to the Chinese state, the company is subject to popular
depictions in the Vietnamese press as an agent of the Chinese state in terms of both internet
sovereignty practices and the role of information in broader geopolitics. This finding cannot
determine the ultimate cause of Baidu’s failure in Vietnam, though at least one quote from an
anonymous Baidu official to the BBC suggests that anti-Chinese sentiment certainly played a
part in this failure.

Whatever its causal veracity, this finding has clear implications for those policy actors who seek
to predict the effects of the international expansion of Chinese technology companies. Quite
apart from evidence gathered elsewhere which suggests that Baidu is progressing the
information control goals of the Chinese state outside Chinese borders (Fei Chang Dao, 2014),
this study suggests that the market impact of such companies is potentially limited by negative
public perceptions of the Chinese state and Chinese technology companies. These perceptions
may be linked to public understandings in those markets of the link between Chinese
government and Chinese information technology companies within Chinese borders, and may
also be linked to broader perceptions of Chinese geopolitics held by government actors and the
wider public which go beyond any appeal Baidu’s practices in China may hold for other

conscious or not: impacts from business, culture or politics are natural … Baidu in Brazil will bring Chinese-style
influence to Brazilian netizens and Brazil as a whole’ (Hexun, 2014). Such reports suggest that for the state, at
least, Baidu is also closely associated with Chinese geopolitical goals and ‘internet sovereignty’ even outside the
state, although no such reporting exists in Vietnam and although, as described, Baidu likely receives little concrete
assistance from the state in its international expansion and operates entirely as a private actor.
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authoritarian states. This effect may be particularly acute in markets already dominated by
Google, which offers a stark alternative, and where the government lacks the ability to control
the market absolutely. For Chinese technology companies outside China, then, the failures of
Chinese soft power in a range of fields-including the ways it manages the informational rights of
its own citizens-may prove influential.

This study extends existing work on the role of search engines and other technology platforms
in ‘national information shaping strategies’ (Diebert and Rohozinski, 2010, 6) by analyzing the
impact of such strategies outside national borders. It shows that such platforms are not only
socially and culturally embedded, but geopolitically embedded as well. The geopolitics of tech
is an emerging issue, hinted at by a body of work on the geopolitics of internet governance (see
Mueller 2010 and Wagner 2011). However, there is limited research on the geopolitics of
internet technology companies rather than on the internet infrastructure itself. This paper
demonstrates that the expansion of Chinese internet companies suggests a fruitful research
agenda on the geopolitical implications and associations of internet technology companies. This
agenda extends beyond Chinese companies. For example, the Snowden revelations have shown
that Western companies, particularly those associated with the United States, can also be
associated with geopolitical goals. This association is arguably strengthened, in retrospect,
within the context of US internet freedom agendas. Indeed, the limited existing body of work
on the geopolitics of technology companies has so far focused on the link between US internet
policy and US foreign policy (Carr 2013, McCarthy 2010).

Baidu’s failure in Vietnam shows that internet platforms have or are perceived by publics to
have geopolitical implications. It also shows that, in this instance, the state is defined by its
information practices as much as by its territory. Here, Baidu’s association with the practices of
Chinese internet sovereignty means the company itself and its approach to information are
bounded, even in the borderless plains of cyberspace beyond the Great Firewall.
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